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Os autores deste artigo situam-se numa perspectiva analítica que define o clientelismo em
África como um recurso potencial para a participação e responsabilização política, a fim de
reflectir sobre a lógica da descentralização em Moçambique nas condições do falhanço social e
económico do projecto revolucionário da Frelimo. Nos últimos quinze anos, desde que se
introduziu um programa de reajustamento estrutural sob os auspícios do FMI e do Banco
Mundial, Moçambique tem estado a tentar desmantelar o seu altamente centralizado processo
político, num contexto em que o auxílio ao desenvolvimento tem registado uma influência
crescente no funcionamento das instituições do Estado.
The authors of this article draw from an analytical perspective which defines clientelism in
Africa as a potential resource for political participation and accountability, in order to then dis-
cuss the logic of decentralization in Mozambique under the conditions of the economic and
social failure of Frelimo's revolutionary project. Over the past fifteen years, since the intro-
duction of a structural adjustment project under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank,
Mozambique has been attempting to dismantle its highly centralized political process against
the background of an ever increasing influence of development aid on the functioning of state
institutions.
Les auteurs de cet article se situent dans une perspective analytique qui définit le cliente-
lisme en Afrique come une ressource potentielle pour la participation et responsabilisation
politique, pour réfléchir dans cette perspective sur la décentralization au Moçambique dans les
conditions de la faillite sociale et économique du project révolutionnaire de la Frelimo. Dans
les derniers quinze ans, pendant qu'était introduit un programme d'ajustement structurel
sous les auspices du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale, Moçambique a essayé le démantèlement
de son processus politique hautement centralisé, dans un contexte où l'aide au développement
a connu une influence croissante dans le fonctionnement des institutions de l'État.
Introduction
Development agencies criticize African political systems for being states with dis-
torted structures. Corruption, nepotism, embezzlement or an inflexible, inefficient
bureaucracy are seen as typical features of African states. These are often called clep-
tocratic or clientelist. The proposed remedies are numerous and contain different
ingredients, like democracy, good governance, the rule of law and decentralization. 
Decentralization, in particular, is a development project with a long history.
However, successful cases of decentralization are hard to find. The reason for this
constant failure can only in part be found in the decentralization programs them-
selves. Processes of decentralization are, like any other institutional and political
innovation, shaped by the political and institutional context within which they take
place. 
Corruption, nepotism, embezzlement or an inflexible, inefficient bureaucracy can
be found across the board in Africa. However, stressing these similarities at the level
of symptoms does not take account of the differences which exist among African
states. We focus on the issue of decentralization in Mozambique to try to develop an
approach for a more systematic analysis of political and institutional innovation in
Africa.
Our paper tries to accomplish two tasks. First, based on a short summary of the
decentralization debate we develop a simple framework for the analysis of the polit-
ical systems in which decentralization takes place. Second, we apply this framework
to Mozambique discussing decentralization efforts against the background of a
changing political system. 
Our analytical framework seeks to simplify the complexity and diversity of polit-
ical systems. This is partly due to the fact that this is work in progress, i.e. unfinished
business that needs further refinement and differentiation. We do think, however,
that simplification can highlight central issues and trigger off critical discussion.
Decentralization
Since the 1960s and 1970s the focal point of decentralization has remained the
same. There is the belief that implementation of development policies can/should be
supported by a redistribution of tasks from central governments to the regional and
local level. 
The hopes were, and still are, that people will be reached more directly and devel-
opment activities can react better and quicker to specific needs at the local level.
Furthermore, it is believed that this can make the implementation of policies more
efficient and effective. 
Currently, the concept of decentralization goes together with the general demand
for «good governance», the promotion of the private sector in services (e.g. water)
and with «democratization». It is expected that the shift in decision-making to the
local level will make room for people’s participation at the same time as effecting a
change to a more needs-oriented policy. 
The experience of former decentralization programs shows typical problems1.
Analyses usually highlight among other aspects the lack of financial resources at the
local level. With only limited income, so the argument goes, additional tasks can
hardly be managed. Another common problem is the bad shape in which equipment
and administrative infrastructure are, shortage of qualified staff as well as problems
in creating reliable, transparent and accountable local institutions. 
A closer look shows that decentralization processes have contradictory outcomes.
Decentralization does not guarantee more local autonomy, but may strengthen the
national government’s position at the local level (devolution). Even when decentral-
ization takes effect, decision making is delegated to the local level and local commu-
nities gain some local autonomy, this does not automatically lead to more participa-
tion, more efficiency or even more orientation towards the needs of the population.
We may also find new forms of intermediary rule of local leaders who only in part
accept the nation state. Power may still be based on military strength, control of local
resources, traditional authority and/or on the ability to act as brokers for external
resources from the national state or non-governmental organisations (Rösel, 1999).
Decentralization is often associated with the image of a local community living in
harmony. This is far from reality. Often, it is even unclear who is part of a local com-
munity and who is not, who has the right to speak or to decide. Therefore, local gains
in autonomy may accentuate local conflicts and open up new political arenas for
political disputes among powerful local actors. In such cases, we find a dynamiza-
tion of local-level politics. The chances for the population to influence local politics
vary substantially according to the specific situation.
Up to now, the official discourse of development organisations has seemed to
have underrated the political dimensions of decentralization. The concept of decen-
tralization as used by development organizations implies that the restructuring of
administrative organization could be an instrument for a well targeted change of pat-
terns of administrative action and policy implementation. But the intended change
can only be attained if the administration accepts and follows the new rules. In
Africa, at least, this cannot be assumed. More often than not African administrations
have strong personalized elements and do not follow established rules strictly. In fact,
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1 See: Barkan, 1989; Cheema, 1983; Illy, 1986; Illy, 1988; Lachenmann, 1991; Lachenmann, 2001; Leonard, 1982; Olivares-
Canas, 2000; Oyugi, 1986; Oyugi, 1994; Oyugi, 1995; Rondinelli, 1986; Rösel, 1999; Schuster, 1997; Wunsch, 1998; or
the conference «Décentralisation et savoir local», 16.-18.2.2002, in Bamako/Mali.
the impact of decentralization programs depends not only on the decentralization
program itself, but also on the political system at work. At the same time, however, a
decentralization program may change the political system. Therefore, we analyze
processes of decentralization in a wider framework that includes the political system
and the interactions between decentralization and the political system. 
The nature of politics: a simple framework for analysis
Our theoretical perspective focuses on an instrumental concept of politics. To this
end we shall highlight participation and the implementation of political decisions as
the central analytical features of a polity. 
Thus, we describe political participation as the active commitment of people in
practical-political processes with a given chance of influencing political decisions2.
Political participation may take place in formal and informal institutions and accord-
ing to formal procedures or informal processes. People may participate directly in
small communities in a common decision-making process or in larger units via a
plebiscite. They can participate indirectly by delegating decisions to representatives.
These may be notables, elders, leaders with personal authority or formally elected
delegates. This indirect participation may be fueled by public discussions that influ-
ence the setting of an agenda, promotes specific decisions and criticizes other politi-
cal decisions. The role of public opinion highlights an important second element of
indirect participation, i.e. accountability. Accountability makes political representa-
tives responsible for their decisions and the impact they have and ties representatives
to their constituency or supporters. Except for the rare cases where everyone is direct-
ly involved in political decisions participation breaks down into two elements, name-
ly (a) influence on the decision making process and (b) accountability of decision
makers. In our view one implies the other, i.e. there can be no accountability without
peoples’ influence and vice-versa. 
The opposite of participation is authoritarian rule (non-participation), where deci-
sions are taken by a leader or a small group in power. In such a set-up the people at
large are excluded from the decision-making process and decision makers are not
held accountable.
The second analytical dimension of a polity is how political decisions are imple-
mented. We assume two ideal-types: (a) a Weberian-type bureaucracy under the rule
of law and (b) an arbitrary mode of implementation of political decisions. 
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2 Political participation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy.
(a) A Weberian-type bureaucracy under the rule of law is based on a strong
administration which implements decisions taken by local political decision-makers.
The implementation process is regulated by rules and laws embedded in a general
constitution. Briefly, the whole implementation process is under the rule of law. At
least ideally, this Weberian-type bureaucracy follows universalistic principles and
acts irrespective of persons. We call this the Weberian-type bureaucratic mode of
implementation. In the framework of law and established rules the administration
acts according to a routine and most activities can be carried out without the require-
ment that a political decision be taken for every new case. There is a strict normative
hierarchy with the constitution on the top followed by laws, by-laws and personal
decisions at the bottom (Elwert 2001, 422). This legally bounded autonomy can be
seen as a condition for an administration to work efficiently. There is, however, a cave-
at, namely that administrative efficiency does not guarantee «good» or «successful»
policy. 
(b) The opposite of this is the arbitrary mode of implementation, where adminis-
tration does not follow strict rules. All decisions are single-case matters as a result of
the arbitrariness of the authority in power. Therefore, all activities of the administra-
tion are highly personalized in a double sense. First, decisions depend on the author-
ity of persons in power and not on rules or laws. Second, the administration always
takes into account who will be affected by a decision or activity. In the context of an
arbitrary mode of implementation decisions and activities depend basically on
power, personal influence, and personal relationships, and are not generally predict-
able. Compared to the Weberian-type bureaucracy there is a reversal of the norma-
tive hierarchy (Elwert 2001, 422): highest are personal decisions of those with author-
ity, followed by by-laws; laws and the constitution are at the bottom. There is no gen-
eral administrative routine. Every decision risks revision by new political decisions.
On the basis of a combination of the two analytical dimensions, mode of imple-
mentation and political participation, we have constructed four highly simplified
ideal types of political systems: (1) liberal democracy under the rule of law, (2)
authoritarian state under the rule of law, (3) command state and (4) competitive polit-
ical clientelism (see table 1).
TABLE 1: TYPES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS
political participation mode of implementation
Weberian-type bureaucracy arbitrary
participative elements liberal democracy under the rule of law competitive political clientelism
authoritarian rule authoritarian state under the rule of law command state
These are ideal-types which provide analytical instruments with which to
describe reality with reference to specific theoretical constructions. The Weberian-
type bureaucratic mode of implementation and the arbitrary mode of implementa-
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tion constitute a continuum of more or less bureaucratic and arbitrary elements. This
holds true for the dimension of participation, too. The question is not participation or
no participation, but rather how much participation and accountability, and what
type of participation. Our analytical instrument is a two dimensional scale (mode of
implementation, participation). The ideal types represent the combination of
extremes (see figure 1). 
1. Participative-Weberian-type bureaucracy
A Weberian-type bureaucratic mode of implementation combined with political
participation describes the ideal type of liberal democratic constitutional states under
the rule of law. Decisions are the outcome of a process that includes political partici-
pation. They are formulated and implemented as general laws and rules with gener-
al validity. Western democracies claim to represent this type of political system.
2. Authoritarian-Weberian-type bureaucracy 
A Weberian-type bureaucratic mode of implementation without political partici-
pation describes the ideal type of a non-democratic, centralized, authoritarian, con-
stitutional state under the rule of law. Examples that present the main elements of this
type are Prussia in 19th century or late colonial Hong Kong. 
3. Authoritarian-arbitrary systems
An arbitrary mode of implementation without political participation describes a
strictly centralized, authoritarian state with an arbitrary use of power. Even decisions
of minor importance are taken at the top level. Civil servants follow only direct
orders (commands) from their supervisors (»par ordre du moufti») to whom they are
accountable. The top level is overloaded, and minor decisions at the lower levels are
taken without clear commands. The top level faces a potential control deficit which
is then compensated for by secret service institutions and the promotion of denunci-
ation. However, lower levels gain some freedom of decision on their own (Elwert
2001, 430f). The result of this is the creation of chances for corruption and embezzle-
ment on every level. Arbitrariness goes together with an uncontrolled power of the
state apparatus which often results in cruelty. We call this type a «command state»
using term Elwert’s (2001; see also Bierschenk et alii 1993) which was applied to Benin
during its «socialist» phase, but which can also be an accurate description of other
African states (e.g. Rwanda under Habyarimana)3.
4. Participative-arbitrary systems
An arbitrary mode of implementation combined with political participation
describes a kind of «soft state» (Myrdal 1979) with a low degree of centralization and
elements of political competition (see also: Chabal/Daloz 1999). Political decisions
may be taken on all administrative and political levels according to their importance
and the personal authority and power of office-holders. The striking difference from
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3 Elwert (2001) gives a detailed analysis of typical strategies and features of arbitrariness in African states including
forms of clientelism (Elwert 2001, 434f), which we differentiate from the command state because of its potential for
participation.
the command state is a double accountability, both upwards and downwards.
Political decisions and administrative activities are directed to the political constitu-
ency of politicians and/or to people in the political process who can offer power,
influence and resources. Due to participation politicians must serve their constituen-
cy, their power base, or else risk losing their position. The power of politicians and
administrators is limited by this erratic accountability to the people. We see groups
of people fighting for national or local resources in a «competitive political cliente-
lism». 
This type is hardly found in its pure form. At the same time we find in African
political systems elements of this participative-arbitrary mode, albeit combined
with elements of authoritarian control. A good example of this mix was the compet-
itive political clientelism of Kenyatta’s Kenya. In the 1990s, when the wave of dem-
ocratization hit Africa, elements of this last type soared in importance. Political cli-
entelism is based on voluntary personal relations between a patron and a client, two
partners of unequal status. They exchange goods and services according to a logic
based on the control of the exchange of resources (Roniger, 1994 ; Weber Pazmino,
1991)4.
The patron offers protection, land rights, security, brokerage or political represen-
tation. The client offers labor, services, loyalty and political support. Democratic elec-
tions, in particular, offer people the chance to choose their patron. The election of a
local member of parliament can include the installation of a patron-client relation-
ship: People offer themselves as clients to competing patrons (politicians running for
parliamentary seats). From the client’s point of view there are two main questions to
asses the patron (Neubert, 1999a; Neubert, 1999b): what chances does a patron have
of acquiring power/influence? will a patron be willing to share the resources he may
gain?
In addition to this two-dimensional framework the results of a decentralization
process are also influenced by the relationship between the national state and the
local level. Two aspects must be considered in this respect: the presence of the state
in local everyday life; the control over (financial) resources.
The presence of the state in local everyday life can be analyzed following John
Dewey’s description of the state as a public space which arises as a result of attempts
to render social life predictable and ordered (Dewey 1991 (1927)). In this sense, the
presence of the state in local settings can be indicated mainly by the following
aspects: 
– the assertion of the monopoly of violence, 
– the regulation of the local legal order, 
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4 The voluntary element may be limited because clients have only a limited or no choice between different patrons.
They can only decide whether they accept a patron-client relationship or not. However, without a minimum of vol-
untary decision the relationship may change to slavery, serfdom or suppression. Often, this voluntary element of
patron-client relationships is not effected in the discussion.
– the ability to make local people subject to national taxes or the influence of state
services like technical infrastructure (roads, water, electricity) and social services on
everyday life (schools, health services), or extension services. 
We may distinguish between areas and states where the national state is present
at the local level (capitals, states like Rwanda, South Africa) and those with an absent
state (Northern Kenya, rural areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central
African Republic).
The control over (financial) resources highlights a simple fact: as long as the local
level relies on government subsidies, it will remain under the scrutiny of central gov-
ernment. Gaining more local autonomy is linked to the ability to create own resour-
ces over and above such subsidies. This may be in the form of local taxes, control over
natural resources or direct access to development finance.
This analytical framework should help us describe the varying impact of decen-
tralization programs in a systematic way in relation to the political system. A few
simple examples where the basic features of the political system remain unchanged
can show this relationship. Decentralization may have different effects in authoritar-
ian and participative systems. Under authoritarian rule decentralization may be used
by the central government to penetrate into the local level, especially in areas where
the state may previously have been only weakly represented (devolution).
Decentralization may also strengthen the state’s control over its citizens and limit
local autonomy. Decentralization in a participative system opens up or strengthens
local level politics, especially when the local level government has, or can find, access
to own resources. In cases where the national state controls key resources this coun-
terbalances possible gains in local autonomy.
Decentralization does not automatically influence the mode of implementation
(Weberian-type bureaucracy or arbitrary), quite the opposite. The arbitrary mode of
decision-making and implementation may be intensified by decentralization, for
local level politics generally includes personalized decision-making and implemen-
tation5. 
The combination of more administrative efficiency and democratization that
should lead to good governance will work best in a participative-Weberian-type
bureaucratic system. Whereas the discussion on decentralization has tended to focus
on financial, technical or organizational problems this shows that decentralization is
also an issue that has to do with the basic features of a political system. 
Key issues in this regard are: 
How does a given political system and the activities of a decentralization project
interact? 
And is decentralization a useful means to support good governance, efficient
administration, democratic participation and needs-oriented local level policy?
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politics are strongly personalized and include many single-case decisions.
The revolutionary state in Mozambique
Our case study draws from the experience of decentralization in Mozambique.
We wish, in particular, to highlight the importance that the nature of politics may
have for the failure or success of a process of democratization. Mozambique is inter-
esting for several reasons. First, because it has been undergoing a process of decen-
tralization under conditions typical of many African countries. These include a struc-
tural adjustment program and the increasing importance of development and
humanitarian aid. Secondly, though, after independence Mozambique chose a revo-
lutionary path to economic and social emancipation typical of very few countries in
Africa (Mali under Modibo Keita, Angola, Mengistu’s Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, etc.) the
failure of which may have posited decentralization not so much as devolution, but
rather as building the state anew.
In our discussion of the revolutionary state we start with a description of the
nature of the post-colonial political order. In the process we will seek to show that the
ensuing revolutionary state had two distinct stages, both of which were the result of
shifts in the mode of implementation of political decisions. Second, we want to argue
that the immediate context for decentralization in Mozambique was the shift in the
mode of implementation and that, therefore, to properly grasp the significance of the
process of decentralization it is necessary to wrestle with the political system.
a)- The early revolutionary state and the legacy of the colonial period
When Mozambique became independent in 1975 Frelimo inherited a political
system which in terms of the analytical framework suggested above can best be
described as one based on a Weberian-type bureaucratic mode of implementation
without political participation. Portuguese colonial rule was based on a rational
bureaucratic apparatus modeled on the Portuguese civil service. From the time when
Portuguese sailors landed on the coast of Mozambique at the end of the fifteenth cen-
tury and declared the territory part and parcel of the Portuguese seaborne empire
their rule had been based on formal laws, edicts and decrees passed by the Crown.
Moreover, those sent to the colony for service, whether military or civil, were part of
an established bureaucratic hierarchy based on merit as legally defined in Portugal. 
Portuguese rule in Mozambique drew its strength from the monopoly of the
means of legitimate violence which the colonial state had been able to achieve by
1920 after the defeat of the last focus of resistance in the north of the country (Newitt
1995). This did not translate into an accountable political system, though. Decision
making institutions such as the civil service, the governor-general and district officers
were staffed by people appointed in Lisbon. Following hard on the steps of fascist
practices in Portugal itself, settlers and Africans had no political rights, except for the
possibility of electing council officials as far as the former were concerned. Mahmood
Mamdani’s description of the colonial system as one based on the distinction
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between citizens and subjects (Mamdani 1996) captures the essence of political par-
ticipation in colonial Mozambique. Indeed, while the European population could
exercise some kind of political rights through formal participation at the local level
and thereby enjoy some form of «citizenship», political participation for the majority
of the African population was constrained by colonial regulations which contemplat-
ed traditional political authorities as the proper arena for Africans’ political participa-
tion.
The Portuguese colonial system had elements of the British system of «indirect
rule». The Portuguese revived, strengthened and stabilized traditional political
authorities and made them the instrument of their colonial rule. In this sense, the so-
called «regulado», the traditional authorities, turned African political participation
into an artefact of bureaucracy. In other words, the «headmen», i.e. those who were
supposed to be the political representatives of the population, were actually the rep-
resentatives of the colonial administration before their own communities. 
Frelimo’s revolutionary government sought to dismantle the edifice of colonial
rule by abolishing the «regulado» and by defining the new state as one based on peo-
ple’s power (Machel 1975). General free elections in a liberal democratic sense were
not seen as necessary. Frelimo justified the abolition of the «regulado» on the grounds
that «headmen» had been «collaborators» who had taken part in the subjugation and
oppression of their own people. A combination of nationalist rhetoric and the mod-
ernization discourse on which Frelimo’s Marxist ideology was premised seems to
have been behind this hostility towards «headmen». Traditional authorities were
seen as an aspect of the traditional society which had to be overcome if socialism was
to be built. Nationalist rhetoric, for its part, drew from the need to form a national
consciousness out of the peoples and cultures which colonial rule had brought
together. The segmentary structure of the «regulado» was seen as an obstacle to the
formation of this national consciousness. 
«People’s power» consisted of the idea that a political system that aimed at doing
away with the «exploitation of man by man» should strive for forms of political par-
ticipation which devolved power to the «oppressed masses» (Machel 1976). In order
to achieve this the liberation movement was transformed into a party in 1977 at its
third congress (Munslow 1983). On the same occasion it declared itself «the van-
guard» of the people which, at least in theory, meant that it represented its aspira-
tions. Moreover, the state was defined as the instrument through which the people,
through the party, would exercise its power. In practice, however, the «vanguard
party», supported by constitutional provisions which outlawed political parties,
exercised its power over the people through the state. The principle of «democratic
centralism» was introduced which lent legitimacy to the leadership claims of the
party and made room for local decision-making units directly accountable to the
party. Much like in the colonial period, people’s political participation was limited to
forms of authority which were not accountable to the people itself, but to a centraliz-
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ing bureaucratic apparatus. Indeed, under the revolutionary government Africans
remained, to use Mamdani’s apt words, «subjects» and hardly became «citizens».
To the extent that Frelimo’s rule was painstakingly codified within the general
framework of building a socialist society it rested on highly formalized bureaucratic
procedures. These procedures defined the work of the state, which consisted in the
main in the implementation of party decisions. The state had an overbearing pres-
ence in society not only through rules and regulations but also through the way in
which it concentrated economic and social activities in its own brief. The nationaliza-
tion of important social services such as health provision and education as well as a
planned economy along Soviet lines defined the framework within which the state
operated. Indeed, in the early years of independence this welfare role which the
Mozambican state took upon itself became an instrument for lending legitimacy to
«people’s power». 
Consistent with the declared socialist goals the state took it upon itself to fashion
a nation of «peasants and workers» (Saul 1985) out of a society fragmented along lin-
eage, racial and regional lines. To this end social relations were codified along Marxist
lines down to the smallest detail rendering the state and the party omnipresent in
everyday life. Curiously, however, the cavalier manner in which the state and the
party treated the population at the level of implementation of political decisions –
building a socialist society of workers and peasants – did not initially translate into
less legitimacy for the political system. In fact, if popular enthusiasm for the new
political structures, language and goals is anything to go by, people seemed to sub-
mit to the new political authority quite voluntarily. Within the rigid political arrange-
ments of the revolutionary era people could hold politicians accountable. The early
Frelimo of the immediate post-independence period was a «puritan» party which
observed a strict moral and political code of conduct (Hanlon 1984). This often found
expression in mass rallies in which the people were encouraged to pinpoint the moral
failings of the leaders, often leading to the demotion or outright sacking of the latter6.
These events were a kind of symbolic and strictly limited form of participation that
excluded critique of the party or party policies as such.
In terms of the ideal-types we use in this paper the early revolutionary stage of
the post-independence period could be classified as one based on an authoritarian
state form under the rule of law. Building socialism in Mozambique in those days
was a highly bureaucratic project firmly entrenched in law – euphemistically called
«socialist legality» - which failed to provide room for the articulation of dissent and
alternative visions of society. Political participation was limited to the rigid channels
of the prevailing political order, a fact which severely constrained participation. The
revolutionary period had a later stage, which was marked by a shift in the mode of
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sacking of a provincial governor accused by the population of being «morally corrupt» (he was allegedly a woman-
izer). 
implementation of political decisions from authoritarianism under the rule of law to
command-like state based on personalized decision-making and contempt for the
rule of law. This shift in the mode of implementation of political decisions was direct-
ly related to the evolution of the political, economic and social situation, which from
the late seventies until the mid-eighties took a turn to the worse. In a sense, this
marked the failure of the revolutionary model. The form that this failure took provid-
ed the immediate background against which decentralization took shape and
acquired meaning. 
b)- The late revolutionary stage and the failure of the model
In the literature on Mozambique there are several explanations for this failure.
They range from a critique of the political orientation itself all the way up to a criti-
cal appraisal of central policies. Michel Cahen, for instance, questions the Marxist cre-
dentials of Frelimo and argues that the ideology was simply used as a cover for a
small «creolised» elite’s will to power (Cahen 1987). Joseph Hanlon sees the reasons
for the failure in the increasing bureaucratic orientation of the state which severed the
party from what he believes to have been traditional links with the population
(Hanlon 1984; see also Adam 1992). This argument is taken up by John Saul, who
deplores serious mistakes in the process of building socialism (Saul 1985; Saul 1993).
Several other authors take issue with Frelimo policies such as what they see as
«forced» villagization (Bowen 2000; Chingono 1996) and ignoring the cultural tradi-
tions of the country (Geffray 1990) as well as too rigid and orthodox an interpretation
of Marxism (Kößler 1992). 
To be sure, all these factors played a role in the failure of the revolutionary project
in Mozambique. Indeed, it was the explosive combination of all these factors that
brought the country to its knees. The war of aggression waged by the Apartheid
regime, for instance, combined with armed insurgency, popular discontent in the face
of increasing economic hardship, rural insecurity, natural hazards and political stag-
nation to deal a heavy blow on Frelimo’s hopes of a socialist society. While a defini-
tive account of the reasons for this has still to be written, there are reasons to assume
that no single factor stands out, although the civil war ranks among the most impor-
tant ones. 
The post-revolutionary period starts actually in 1979/80 with two significant
events. First, the refusal of COMECOM countries to accept Mozambique into their
fold and, second, the start of the civil war in earnest. These events would lead even-
tually to Mozambique’s turn towards the West in the form of the introduction of a
structural adjustment program in the mid-eighties and a growing dependence on
development aid. Reflecting the euphoric mood of the revolutionary period Frelimo
had declared the eighties the decade in which underdevelopment was to be eradicat-
ed. This was based on a modernization blueprint that would have been the pride of
any development theorist (Egerö 1987). This blueprint assumed continued support
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from Eastern bloc countries to compensate for the lack of access to capitalist domi-
nated markets and a performing agricultural sector that would fuel industrial devel-
opment (Schoeller 1992; Wuyts 1989). COMECOM’s refusal to accept Mozambique
severely undermined the premises of the blueprint. Furthermore, with majority rule
in Southern Rhodesia the Mozambican armed gangs which had been created by the
Rhodesian secret services were taken over by the South African military and turned
into an efficient terrorist and destructive machine that made any economic activity in
the rural areas unfeasible. Added to this the country was assailed by a devastating
drought that by 1985 had claimed 100,000 lives. 
The shift from the authoritarian to the command state
and the start of the decentralization project
Our analytical model allows us to capture the dynamic nature of politics in
Mozambique. As indicated above the post-independence period should be divided
into two stages. While in the early stage the revolutionary state was near to our type
of an authoritarian state under the rule of law in the later stage it increasingly resem-
bled a command state. The authoritarian state had placed emphasis on the so-called
«socialist legality» and on ensuring that its decisions were taken and legitimated
within a legal-bureaucratic framework that left little or no room to personal and arbi-
trary authority. This almost pedantic reference to rules and regulations gave the rev-
olutionary state a level of legal-bureaucratic coherence which placed it nearer to a
Weberian-type bureaucratic mode of implementation of political decisions. While
political decisions were constrained to observe ideological purity, and thereby some-
times conflict with more rational courses of action, from a pragmatic rational point of
view the state discharged its functions within a clearly defined and predictable legal
framework. This framework left no room for real participation.
At the same time, the early revolutionary state enjoyed a high degree of legitima-
cy. This legitimacy, however, was directly related to the ability of the state to dis-
charge its functions. With growing economic and social hardships, however, it
became increasingly difficult to justify party political claims over the state. In a sense,
the legitimacy of the revolutionary project rested mainly on the ability of the state to
deliver. The gradual errosion in state capabilities placed the party under strain and
its response to the crisis was increasing reliance on arbitrary forms of political deci-
sion-making. Indeed, there was a shift away from a Weberian-type bureaucratic
mode of implementation to a an arbitrary one based on the personal authority of the
leader of the ruling «vanguard» party. The later revolutionary state became in this
way more like a command state owing still very little accountability to the people. As
the situation continued to deteriorate well into the eighties the ruling party sought
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assistance from Western countries, all of which imposed a structural adjustment pro-
gram with the IMF and the World Bank as a precondition for any kind of economic
aid. At the same time as these demands were made from outside there were also
domestic calls for more accountability and popular influence on the decision-making
process. Enter decentralization. Decentralization as one of the mainstays of develop-
ment came to Mozambique via several roads. These roads had to do with the gener-
al critique of Mozambique’s modernization strategy, lending legitimacy to develop-
ment aid and the pre-conditions for economic growth. 
a)- Critique of Mozambique’s modernization strategy
As we have seen, at independence Mozambique embarked upon a moderniza-
tion project strongly influenced by Marxist ideology. This modernization project was
based on two strong assumptions, namely, first, that the goal of modernization was
not only the eradication of underdevelopment, but also the creation of a socialist soci-
ety based on a workers-peasants alliance and, second, that the project was aimed at
creating a «new man», i.e. one emancipated from the oppressive weight of tradition.
The first assumption found political and institutional underpinnings in the policy of
«democratic centralism», i.e. the concentration of political decision-making power in
the «vanguard party». The second assumption was predicated on the creation of new
organizational structures at the local level which saw no role for traditional political
institutions.
As the revolutionary state encountered mounting economic, political and social
problems those who set about searching for the causes leveled responsibility on the
assumptions behind the modernization strategy itself. This critique was particularly
articulated by those who felt that Frelimo’s radical politics was making tabula rasa of
traditional African culture (Geffray 1990). This was seen as a recipe for disaster. The
critique concentrated especially on Frelimo’s policy of forced villagization and the
dismissal of traditional political authorities (the so-called «regulado») from power.
Both policies were seen not only as having contributed towards the alienation of the
majority of the people from the party and state, but also as a setback to the declared
goal of emancipating the people from the shackles of tradition. Decentralization pro-
grams in the country ritually include references to the need to rehabilitate tradition-
al cultural institutions as the safest and politically sound way to consolidate democ-
racy.
Added to this is the ongoing debate in Mozambique concerning what people
from the north and centre of the country perceive as the concentration of power by
southern elites. Indeed, this debate has become a central issue in national politics. The
perception is that Frelimo is a southern party that used Marxism and nationalism to
advance its sectarian goals. The main opposition party, Renamo, has been quite suc-
cessful in portraying itself as the defender of the north and centre against southern
hegemony. In spite of its chilling record of terror against civilians during the civil war
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(Finnegan 1992; Gersony 1988; Hall and Young 1997), Renamo captured a sizable
portion of the vote in the two general elections held in Mozambique since the sign-
ing of the general peace agreement in 1992. Election analysts in Mozambique (Serra
1998) believe that this share of the vote correlates with Renamo’s regional discourse.
Consequently, calls for decentralization on the part of the opposition are also
attempts at reducing the power of southern elites over the country.
b)- Lending legitimacy to development aid
Up until 1980 the revolutionary state had been able to remain in overall control of
the development process (Hanlon 1991). This was partly due to the fact that up until
then the self-confidence of the authorities, bolstered by good economic and social
indicators as well as the general euphoria over the building of a new society, was
such that foreign agencies had to look for niches for themselves within an established
institutional framework. With increasing economic difficulties made worse by a dev-
astating drought and the ever mounting insecurity in the wake of the civil war,
Mozambique became more and more dependent on foreign relief agencies for pro-
viding succor to its own population. With mounting confidence relief agencies began
to see the Government of Mozambique and its bureaucratic procedures as an obsta-
cle in their efforts to provide relief and initiate development at the local level (see par-
ticularly Hanlon 1991).
First relief organisations and then development organisations became increasing-
ly vocal in their criticism of Mozambique’s state organization. They resented having
to submit their relief operations and small development projects to the scrutiny of
central state institutions and pressed for direct access to the population in need. Their
unease with the role of the state and the pressure they exerted for more freedom of
movement gained the quality of justified arguments in the international neo-liberal
context of the 1980s and early 1990s. Ironically, the rise of the New Right in Britain
and the US with its neo-liberal rhetoric helped aid and relief organisations to argue
that only they had the expertise and adequate institutional arrangements to create the
conditions for market forces to respond. The problem with Mozambique, they
argued, was that the state wanted to regulate everything, even those areas where aid
and relief agencies had proven more competent elsewhere. Decentralization, as far as
these organisations were concerned, was not only a way of reducing the constrain-
ing impact of state regulation on the provision of relief and development impulses,
but also a strategy for limiting the influence of the state at the local level in order to
render the latter more autonomous and a legitimate partner of development agen-
cies.
c)- Pre-conditions for economic growth
The mark left by neo-liberal rhetoric in international development has come to be
known as the «Washington consensus». The IMF and the World Bank arrived in
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Mozambique in the mid 1980s when the country was in the throes of civil war and
general economic chaos. True to their standard practice the policy recommendations
which both institutions made and enforced assumed that Mozambique’s way out of
the crisis would have to be an increase in exports and, more particularly, a scaling
down of the state. The latter assumption was captured in the policy of «deregula-
tion». In Mozambique deregulation took the form of dismantling the remnants of the
revolutionary project through privatization, cuts in the social budget and encourag-
ing private enterprise. Accordingly, the state disengaged from the economy by sell-
ing state companies, withdrew from its social commitments by cutting down on its
health and education expenditures and, more generally, narrowed its economic pol-
icy focus to macro economic issues relinquishing, thereby, its ordering role in society
to a heterogeneous combination of private voluntary organisations, private enterpris-
es and a whole host of foreign official development agencies (for a more extensive
discussion of these issues see Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995; Hanlon 1996; Knauder
2000; Kyle 1994; Macamo 1999; Pitcher 1993). 
In this neo-liberal context decentralization appeared as a necessary precondition
for economic development. Structural adjustment was not only about rebuilding the
country’s economy, but also about doing so according to the terms laid down by the
«Washington consensus», namely deregulation and privatization. 
d)- Decentralizing the post-revolutionary state
The institutional program that gave coherence to all of these three roads was a
decentralization project funded partly by the German Technical Cooperation agency
(GTZ). This was based in the Ministry for State Administration (MSA) and was
budgeted at over DM 8 million over an initial five year time-frame7. The main poli-
cy decisions taken by the ministry in the context of this decentralization project were
consistent with the first two roads, namely critique of modernization strategy and
lending legitimacy to development aid. The decisions were of a double nature.
Firstly, they reopened the debate on the role of traditional authorities in the process
of democratization. To this end researchers at the MSA argued that the traditional
system of political authority had been perverted by the Portuguese colonial system
(Lundin, Machava, and Mozambique. Nucleo de Desenvolvimento Administrativo.
1995) and that by abolishing it at independence the revolutionary state had acted
upon a caricature. The subsequent development of the country, so the argument
went, had shown that these political structures maintained their relevance to the peo-
ple, as the massive support of the rural population for the armed rebellion against the
central state seemed to suggest. One practical result of this policy was the approval
of a law introducing elected council bodies in 33 cities and towns in 1997. Secondly,
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7 Sabine Fandrych’s study (2001) provides a well-researched analysis of the process of decentralisation in
Mozambique. It is more compreehensive in scope than we can be and delves into the details of what we can only
brieffly sketch here.
the policy decisions were geared towards rehabilitating the state itself before society
by introducing the principle of subsidiarity in the administrative apparatus. «Civil
society» in the form of voluntary private organisations were seen as key intermedia-
ry actors in this undertaking whose small-scale presence at the grassroots level
would help empowering local communities and devolving responsibility for policy
failures. This approach was particularly obvious in legislative initiatives such as the
reform of land law, which gave local communities primacy over the central state in
decisions over land entitlements. 
While it seems too early to assess the impact of decentralization rhetoric as well
as decentralization projects such as the one carried out by the GTZ there are several
remarks that can be made concerning the context and future scenarios. As indicated
further above decentralization was not merely yet another piece of developmental
mumbo-jumbo in Mozambique. There was an internal social, political and econom-
ic context which called for it. The recent political history of the country provided the
immediate background. Subsequently, though, the different interests which were
articulated within this context seemed to have acted as constraints on the process
itself. One particularly important set of interests was that articulated by the main
opposition party which manoeuvred itself into a dilemma somehow representative
of the limits of decentralization in developing countries.
The cease-fire agreement under the auspices of the UN (Alden 2001; Cabrita 2000;
Chan and Venâncio 1998; D’Agnino 1999; Durch 1996) which ended Mozambique’s
bloody war provided for democratic elections. Renamo had to transform itself into a
political party, a process which included the formulation of a political program.
Given that throughout the civil war it had argued that it was fighting for the rehabil-
itation of traditional cultural values its re-invention as a political party was premised
on the articulation of the grievances of all those who bore a grudge against the cen-
tral state. Accordingly, Renamo sought to convey the public image of a party of local
communities and their traditional political structures pitched in battle against an
intolerant state. This identification of the party with such interests proved an effect-
ive motivational gimmick, the long-term success of which was premised on
Renamo’s conquest of central state power. Herein lies a fundamental contradiction.
Renamo’s power base was by definition away from the central state, but in order to
translate its authority into real power Renamo had to seize state power. Accordingly,
Renamo consistently mobilized all its resources towards this objective. This has
included, among other things, the refusal to take part in council elections (which
would have provided it with an institutionally legitimated local power-base) as well
as the rejection of election results as fraudulent even though they were deemed free
and fair by international observers, some of whom were traditional Renamo backers.
At the same, though, Renamo has been pressing for the right to nominate provincial
governors and district administrators in those regions where it was the most voted
political party. 
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The strategy of the main opposition political party follows in part an internal logic
which has to do with Renamo’s difficulties in re-inventing itself as a political party.
At the same time though, it is a response to the rhetoric and practice of decentraliza-
tion in the country. As such it is a commentary on the shape of things to come, for it
expresses a dilemma faced by those pressing for decentralization. On the one hand
there is an acknowledged need for devolving political decision-making and invest-
ing local structures not only with nominal power, but also with resources to muscle
up that power. On the other hand, however, devolution under these terms is only
possible within the framework of a central state strong enough to pursue the goals of
the program in a consistent manner and against claims to authority which under-
mine its integrity.
The demands of the opposition are not for more autonomy for local communities
and lower level administrative structures. They are rather arguments for more power
for itself in those levels. Similarly, when development agencies call for more decision
making competency in lower levels the outcome is not more local level democracy,
but rather more freedom for these agencies in the implementation of their develop-
ment and humanitarian activities. The same goes for international finance institu-
tions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Decentralization does not increase the abil-
ity of local authorities and communities to formulate their own investment and
growth priorities, but rather it allows private businesses to circumvent the central
state in their bids.
The rhetoric and practice of decentralization in Mozambique provides thus an
institutional framework for the articulation of particularist interests. These interests
do not necessarily reflect those of the local communities on behalf of whose autono-
my decentralization is being implemented. In the present context of decentralization
such particularist interests serve as an intermediary between the central state and
local communities. The resulting arrangement is a potentially clientelist political
order. Indeed, in their search for financial resources local communities may seek
sponsorship from NGOs which, for their part, are also in search of projects to be
funded. As a result of these overlapping interests there may be a supply-led process
of development (see Neubert 2000) within which local communities do not necessa-
rily enjoy direct political participation. Rather, they may exercise their right to be
heard through the agency of patron institutions, i.e. NGOs, with a certain leverage on
the central decision-making organs. Via this indirect chance participation an element
of accountability towards the people is introduced into the political system. This
development is not entirely consistent with the aims of decentralization, and yet it
reflects what is possible within the historical framework of the Mozambican political
system. In this sense, it is fair to assume that the decentralization of the revolutionary
state goes hand in hand with the transformation of the command state into some sort
of competitive political clientelism. In other words, decentralization is not leading
directly to devolution, but to the creation of institutional and informal mechanisms
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for local communities to have their voice heard in central organs. This is mainly done
by particularist interests canvassing for space away from the state. 
Conclusions
We started from the theoretical premise that decentralization is a process that is
deeply related to the particular political system in itself. While this may appear obvi-
ous it is important to stress its relevance by drawing attention to the fact that the for-
tunes of decentralization are to a large extent linked to the political context.
Decentralization in a polity characterized by a Weberian-type bureaucratic mode of
implementation is less problematic than decentralization in a polity based on an arbi-
trary mode of implemmentation. In the former decentralization is indeed about dev-
olution and rendering administration more efficient, whereas in the latter it may pri-
marily be about escaping state influence or reconstructing state forms.
Our case study seems to confirm our theoretical premise. Indeed, decentralization
in Mozambique seems to have been linked to the overall changes in the political sys-
tem. While in the immediate post-colonial period Mozambique’s political system
showed features of a Weberian-type bureaucratic mode of administration with low
participation the current political arrangements seems to have more participation.
There are reasons to believe that decentralization does not match the expectations of
the development agencies. Especially the simple hope that decentralization plus
political participation will enforce each other and lead to a liberal democracy did not
materealise. There were three reasons for this.
First, the evolution of the state after independence was marked by a shift from an
authoritarian state to a command-state. In other words, the political system evolved
from a mode of implementation strongly anchored in law and rules to an arbitrary
one. We suggested that this shift might be accounted for by the economic and social
problems faced by the revolutionary state.
Second, decentralization, which came in many guises, actually strengthened the
arbitrary mode of implementation by encouraging and giving legitimacy to forms of
authority not directly sanctioned by the state. Interestingly, though, this increase in
arbitrariness was compensated by a corresponding increase in participation. The
presence of development agencies and their support for decentralization made room
for the articulation of local concerns within political grass-root contexts. However, the
support accorded to local level politics by development agencies may have under-
mined the power of the state over the distribution and application of external funds
in local settings. 
Third, and finally, access to development funds at the local level can be counter-
productive as far as participation is concerned. Donors’ criteria for the allocation of
70 THE REORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL STRUCTURES IN MOZAMBIQUE
funds may gain supremacy over local priorities and, moreover, slow down activities
geared towards tapping local resources. This may have the effect of promoting
«extraversion» to use Bayart’s term, i.e. the general orientation of local actors towards
maximizing their external dependence.
The failure of decentralization to match the expectations of development agencies
is not a comment on the idea itself, but rather on the failure to take the political sys-
tem into account, against the background of which such policies are implemented. In
Mozambique it is precisely this failure that leads us to assume that decentralization
heralds a new political system based on competitive clientelism.
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